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RECENT DECISIONS
DUTY TO PROVIDE EQUAL PROTECTION: POLICE OFFICERS'
LIABILITY FOR NON-FEASANCE UNDER SECTION 1983 OF THE
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
In Hutey v. Barloga' the northern district court of Illinois recently
interpreted section 1983- of the federal civil rights act' as providing a
federal remedy4 through a civil action sounding in tort against state or
local officers whose negligent failure to preserve law and order has
resulted in any citizen or class of citizens being denied the right to
equal protection of the laws guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment.'
In so interpreting section 1983, the decision has raised significant
questions as to the scope of the section, the necessity of pleading an
intentional action by the defendant public officer when an equal protection
action is brought under the section, and the existence of a satisfactory
standard for determining if a cause of action under the section has been
stated.
Huey and New Applications of 1983
The Negro plaintiff in Huey brought an action under sections
1. 277 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any
citizens of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Montroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60
Nw. U.L. REv. 277, 279 (1965) is an excellent source for a background of the Civil
Rights Act with particular emphasis on section 1983.
4. "The general rule in absence of statutory enactment seems to be that officers
of a municipal corporation are not individually liable for the improper exercise of
discretionary powers." Browne v. Bentonville, 94 Ark. 80, 12 S.W. 93 (1910). See also
Manwaring v. Geisler, 191 Ky. 532, 230 S.W. 918 (1921); Askay v. Maloney, 85 Ore.
333, 166 P. 29 (1919); Growbarger v. U.S. Fidelity and G. Co., 126 Ky. 118, 102 S.W.
873 (1907). Also, see generally Annot., 18 A.L.R. 197 (1922).
There is authority, however, that officers may be liable for wilful and malicious
exercise of powers rested in them, or a gross neglect of duty. Templeton v. Beard, 159
N.C. 63, 74 S.E. 735 (1912) ; Longstreet v. Mecosta County, 228 Mich. 542, 200 N.W.
248 (1924).
5. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1:
. . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.
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1985' and 19867 of the Civil Rights Act against the trustees, employees,
and agents of Cicero, Illinois, seeking damages for the death of his son.'
Vhile walking on a sidewalk in Cicero, the son had been severely beaten
by a group of white youths and died four days later. In asserting his claim
the plaintiff attempted to show a civil conspiracy by the defendants, based
upon the decedent's race, to deprive his son of the "right to peaceably
travel the streets of Cicero with the same freedom as is secured to white
persons," 9 a right which allegedly could have been secured through
reasonable diligence by the defendants. The district court granted a motion
to dismiss the actions under both sections for failure to state a specific
act or omission in dereliction of duty proximately causing the injury.
Looking to other possible theories upon which relief could be granted,
however, the court examined the sufficiency of the complaint in stating a
cause of action under section 1983.
Section 1983 provides for the civil liability of any person who, under
color of state law, deprives another of his constitutional rights."0 In
discussing the applicability of the section the court relied heavily upon
the broad language used by the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape." In
that case the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, had said
that "section 1983 should be read against the background of tort liability
that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his acts. '"1 2
The emphasis on "natural consequences" effectively eliminated the re-
quirement for pleading a specific or purposeful intent to discriminate or
deprive one of a constitutional right whenever "facts constituting depri-
vation . . . of a right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment are
alleged" in an action under section 1983.13 However, the complaint
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1964).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1964).
8. Sections 1985 and 1986 of the Civil Rights Act strike out against conspiracies
to deprive persons of their constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities.
9. 277 F. Supp. at 868.
10. See the language of section 1983 at note 2 supra.
11. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The complaint in 'fonroe involved the invasion by
policemen of the Monroe home without a warrant and the subsequent search and
detention of Mr. Monroe without warrant or arraignment. These acts of the defendant
police officers were found to be a violation of the substantive guarantees against
unreasonable searches and seizures in the fourth amendment, which are now applicable
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 365 U.S. at 171.
12. Prior to Monroe most courts had required an intentional deprivation of a
fourteenth amendment right in both due process and equal protection actions for recovery
under section 1983. See, e.g., cases cited in Klittgard, The Civil Rights Act and Mr.
Monroe, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 145 (1961), for lower courts holding intent necessary for all
such actions brought under section 1983.
13. 365 U.S. at 171. Following the authority of the Supreme Court in Monroe,
lower courts have applied the elimination of the intent requirement to a variety of cases:
United States v. Social Service Dept., 263 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1967) allows
"redress in a federal court for the tortious deprivation by any state official ... of a right
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under section 1983 was deemed insufficient for failure to "allege any
specific acts or omissions by defendants, any causal connection between
such acts or omissions and the deprivations suffered by Huey, or that
the alleged acts or omissions were unreasonable in light of the cir-
cumstances."'"
Omission to Act
While cases prior to Huey arising under section 1983 have involved
a positive act by public officers," Huey appears to be the first case
which would allow recovery for a failure to act without specific notice of
the danger.'6 Starting from the point that the invasion of constitutional
rights need not be intentional but may be merely negligent, the district
court analyzed the complaint in terms of ordinary tort liability arid the
traditional tort concept of "omission of duty" to determine if the dece-
secured by the fourteenth amendment." Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md.
1966) declares that "Monroe affords recovery to citizens injured by the negligent and
irresponsible conduct as well as the wilful actions of state officers." Pierson v. Ray, 352
F.2d 213, 218 (5th Cir. 1965) states that under section 1983, "a cause of action may be
asserted against a state police officer . . . for deprivation of a fourteenth amendment
Constitutional right whether or not done wilfully." For additional cases accepting the
"natural consequences" test in Monroe, see: Dewitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682 (9th Cir.
1966) ; Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 81 (3d Cir. 1965) ; Goldman v. Olson, 286 F. Supp.
35 (W.D. Wis. 1968) ; and Album v. Carey, 283 F. Supp. 3, 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
14. 277 F. Supp. at 873. Several states have previously enacted "immunity"
statutes to shield public officers from the threat of liability incurred in the performance
of their duties. Such statutes reflect the feeling that
public officers should be free to exercise their respective duties without fear
of troublesome and vexatious litigation which would, in effect, deter and hinder
smooth and efficient governmental operations. In addition, it provides an easy
solution to the problem as to whether the individual citizen's constitutional rights
should receive protection as opposed to the 'protection of the public's interest by
shielding responsible governmental officers against harrassment and inequitable
hazards of vindictive or ill founded suits.'
Note, 12 HOWARD L.J. 285, 296 (1966) ; see also Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th
Cir. 1964).
Section 1983 as a federal statute, however, has been interpreted to override this type
of state immunity statute leaving police officers subject to the same dangers under
federal statute. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). See also Klittgard, supra, note
12 at 162.
15. See, e.g. DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682, 684 (9th Cir. 1966) ; Pierson v. Ray,
352 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1965), alleging
that the defendant police officers struck the plaintiff on the head without provocation,
arrested him without a warrant and denied him medical aid and bail; Roberts v.
Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 419 (D. Md. 1966) prisoner alleging that "he was forced
to go naked and lie on a concrete floor without mattress or blankets ... in a temperature
of about forty degrees"; Roberts v. Trapnell, 213 F. Supp. 49, 50 (E.D. Pa. 1962)
alleging that minor plaintiff had been shot by township police officer without just cause,
kicked by officer and refused permission to telephone parents. See also Cohen v. Norris,
300 F.2d 24, 26 (9th Cir. 1962) ; and Selico v. Jackson, 201 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D. Colo.
1962).
16. The plaintiff in Huey sought to hold the police officer defendants liable for
having "wrongfully neglected to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of wrongs
against Jerome Huey ... " 277 F. Supp. at 868.
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dent's constitutional right to equal protection had been denied.'- The
court explictly found that an affirmative duty exists on the part of
policemen and other public officers to preserve law and order and to
provide for the equal protection of all persons in the community; that
failure by the police or city to perform effectively this function would be a
negligent omission of duty and a denial of equal protection, and con-
cluded that "an unreasonable omission of this nature would be actionable
under Section 1983."" 8 Thus, Huey carries the ambit of section 1983 one
step further in suggesting that non-action as well as action may lead
to civil liability under that provision.
Equal Protection and Intent
Although the nature of the complaint in Monroe was clearly that of a
deprivation of due process,"0 the Court's language did not specifically
restrict the elimination of the intent requirement to complaints arising
under that clause of the fourteenth amendment.2" Cases subsequent to
Monroe have either professed to eliminate completely the necessity of
pleading intent under section 198321 or distinguished complaints which
allege a deprivation of the right to equal protection from those alleging
a denial of due process and have restricted the elimination of the require-
ment of pleading intent to the latter.22 The basis for such a limitation is
the Supreme Court decision in Snowden v. Hughes,21 in which the
17. 277 F. Supp. at 872-73.
18. Id.
19. 365 U.S. at 169.
20. While the complaint in Monroe was framed in terms of a denial of due process
and equal protection the Court discussed the complaint and placed its decision only
under the due process clause and did not consider whether the equal protection clause
had also been satisfied. 365 U.S. at 171. Klittgard, supra note 12, at 146, discusses the
significance of the Court's failure in Monroe to consider the equal protection issue.
21. For cases purporting to eliminate intent in all cases arising under section
1983, see DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1966) ; Pierson v. Ray, 352 F.2d 213
(5th Cir. 1965) ; Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965) ; Hornsby v. Allen, 326
F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963) ; Goldman
v. Olson, 286 F. Supp. 35 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Album v. Carey, 283 F. Supp. 3, 5
(E.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. Social Service Dept., 263 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa.
1967) ; Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966) ; Roberts v. Trapnell, 213
F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1962). The facts of all such cases, however, are limited to due
process allegations; thus the language of the courts is mere dicta as to the elimination of
intent as a requirement for equal protection arising under section 1983.
22. Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962), involved a due process complaint
in which the court distinguished between due process and equal protection actions
arising under section 1983. The court in Cohen explicitly recognizes the continuing
validity of the intent requirement in Snowden v. Hughes for equal protection com-
plaints brought under section 1983. In Selico v. Jackson 201 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Cal.
1962), and Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 762 (W.D. La.
1968), the courts distinguish equal protection cases under section 1983 from due process
complaints thereunder and maintain intent as a requirement for equal protection cases
only.
23. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
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Court.emphasized that an intentional, purposeful discrimination is necess-
ary to establish a denial of equal protection of the law for purposes of.
section 1983.2'
The uncertainty reflected in the' cases as to what is required for an
equal protection action is due to the failure of the Monroe opinion eyen to
mention Snowden, although the complaint in Monroe was drawn in terms
of a denial of equal protection as well as due process and the Snowden
decision had preceded that. of Monroe. By construing Monroe and
Snowden together, it is possible to restrict the elimination of the intent
requirement to complaints involving a denial of due process while re-.
taining the stricter requirement of intent for section 1983 complaints
alleging a denial of equal protection.2" Significantly, the decision in Huey
also neglects to mention Snowden in suggesting that a literal reading of
Monroe would allow the elimination of the intent requirement in. due,
process cases to be extended to section 1983 equal protection cases.2"
The Standard of Reasonableness
Eliminating the intent requirement for equal protection actions along
with extending the ambit'of section 1983 to include non-feasance com-
24. In Snowden the Supreme Court stated:
The unlawful administration of a state statute fair on its face resulting in its
unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is* not a,
denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element'-
of intentional or purposeful discrimination . . . (a) discriminatory purpose is
not presumed . . . there must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimina-.
tion.,
321 U.S. at 8.
25. Cohen v. Norris, an unreasonable search and seizure case, announced its inter-
pretation of Monroe to be that "an allegation of a purpose to discriminate . . . is not
essential to the statement of a claim under section 1983 predicated.on .:' the-.die
process clause of the fourteenth amendment." (Emphasis added.). Recognizing the,
continuing validity of Snowden, the court in Cohen further declared that the ruling" of
Snowden Tequiring "an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination in order-to
claim under section 1983 . . . was made with reference to the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." 300 F.2d at 27. See also Zanders v. Louisiana State- Bd. -of
Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968) ; Bargainer v. Michal, 233 F. Supp. .271: (ND ,.
Ohio 1964) ; and Selico v. Jackson, 201 F. Supp. 475 (S. D. Cal. 1962). At' least one
commentator has cogently argued that Monroe should be so limited "for otherwise-every
inadvertent or unintentional distinction between persons or classes of persons arising from"
the administration of state law could give rise to a suit for damages." Klittgard, diupra,
note 12 at 162. , ,
26. The Court declared: 
- .. ,
It is clear that section 1983 has been interpreted to provide a new type of tort-,
the invasion under color of law of a citizen's constitutional rights. It is also '
clear that it is not necessary that this invasion be intentional; it may merely
be negligent.
277 F. Supp. at 872.. .
Whereas the language of section 1985 requires a specific "purpose" to deprive
persons of equal protection the language of section 1983 itself does not include' ary such
requirement of wilful conduct, but allows recovery from one who "subjects or -causes
to be subjected" any citizen of the rights protected. See text of section 1983, supra note -2.-
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plaints may create difficult problems for police officers and others
engaged in administering the law. A major difficulty may be establishing
a standard by which non-action as well as action of police officers can be
judged. In place of the intent requirement and consonant with the tort
language of M1ionroe, lower courts have applied a standard of "the
reasonably prudent man" in actions under section 1983.2 The main
difficulty in replacing intent with a standard of reasonableness lies in the
inherent dissimilarity in the two types of cases most frequently arising
under section 1983. Due process cases such as Monroe generally involve
an overt action by a public official..2 ' Equal protection cases such as Huey
may arise without any such overt action or, possibly, without conscious
inaction. Not only would officials be liable for an "unreasonable" act or
decision, but the non-action of an officer even without knowledge of a
dangerous situation could well lead to personal liability.20
An additional drawback in applying a test of "reasonableness"
under a broad allegation of violation of equal protection is the second
guessing to which discretionary decisions of local authorities would be
subject." Many factors may enter into such a decision, particularly in
law enforcement situations, thus facilitating an argument of "unreason-
able" action or inaction. For example, a decision by police authorities to
oversaturate Area "A" with police protection because of an abnormally
high crime rate in proportion to the number of persons living therein,
and to place less personnel in Area "B", a traditionally low crime area,
could result in suits challenging the propriety of such an allocation.
Additional factors such as the presence or absence of adequate lighting,
size of area to be patrolled in relation to persons living therein, availability
of additional units and limitations of finances, would have to be ana-
lytically evaluated by the person making the allocation decision and
27. Heard v. Rizzo, 281 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Pa. 1968), "emphasizes plaintiffs'
right(s) . . . to be free from the . . . wrongful failure of such officials to take reasonable
action to preserve lav and order. .. ." Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 80 (3d Cir. 1965),
speaks in terms of the "right not to be subjected to an unreasonable and illegal arrest."
See also Bowens v. Knazze, 237 F. Supp. 826, 828 (N.D. Ill. 1965); Baker v. St.
Petersburg, 252 F. Supp. 397, 399 (M.D. Fla. 1966).
28. See description of cases cited in note 15, supra.
29. In Huey the court stated that a failure to act with notice of a possibility
of racial disorder, and the possibility of attacks upon Negroes or other persons, would
constitute a negligent omission and a denial of equal protection actionable under section
1983. 277 F. Supp. at 873. Under ordinary tort doctrine, however, the adoption of a
"reasonableness" standard would seem to allow an action also for the negligent omission
of duty even where the defendant was without notice of danger, i.e., where he should
have known of the danger.
30. See, e.g., McQuire v. Todd, 198 F.2d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 835 (1952), where the court was apprehensive that "upon the mere allegation . . .
every action of a state officer, in the discharge of the duties of his office, may be re-
examined in the federal court."
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subsequently reviewed under a standard of "reasonableness." A standard
of "reasonableness," if loosely applied, would allow any citizen by merely
alleging the deprivation of a fourteenth amendment right to place the
action, or non-action, of a police officer's performance of his duties in
question"' and subject to the scrutiny of a federal judge or jury."
The application of a "reasonableness" standard to non-action cases
also raises subtle problems in determining the culpability of defendants.
The conflict inherent in requiring police officers and other public officials
to exercise discretion in performing their duties while at the same time
holding them liable for errors committed requires a standard which
recognizes the potential threats to each side. 8 Too restrictive an applica-
tion of any standard, however, might effectively eliminate the rights
which section 1983 seeks to protect. Thus, in addition to mere "reason-
ableness," a standard should be utilized which would give full pro-
tection to the fourteenth amendment rights of all persons against public
officers, as intended under section 1983, but which would limit actions
under the statute to those with substantial merit so as not to unduly
harass and interfere with public officers in the performance of their duties.
Possible Solutions
In recognition of the fundamental differences between the two types
of complaints arising under section 1983 and the need to preserve the
rights of citizens while shielding public officials from the threat of undue
litigation, a dual standard is needed. It is suggested that retention of the
intent requirement as expressed in Snowden for equal protection actions,
and limiting Monroe's elimination of the intent requirement to due process
cases would have the desired effect.3"
31. In Bargainer v. Michal, 233 F. Supp. 270, 274 (N.D. Ohio 1964) the court
speaks of the "interest of the public . . . in seeing that the police do not abuse their
power and, conversely, that the police are not harrassed in carrying out their duties by
being subjected to unwarranted law suits." For other comments to this effect, see Selico
v. Jackson, 201 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Cal. 1962), and Klittgard supra note 12, at 162.
32. Under a "reasonableness" standard, the propriety of each such system for dis-
persing officers so as to provide the best protection, equally, would ultimately be a
decision of the federal district judge-not the local authority who lives and works in,
and is most familiar with a particular area. While the advantage of local knowledge
would be lost, the district judge, as a neutral arbiter, would perhaps be better suited
for determining liability in such cases. Such a system for determining liability could
easily lead, however, to the constant harrassment of public officials, by anyone willing
to make the allegations as to unreasonable action or inaction.
33. For a description of the potential threat to law enforcement officers, see
language quoted supra note 14.
34. Maintaining intent as a standard for equal protection cases under section 1983
would avoid plaintiffs challenging non-action of police officers where such officers are
without notice of the particular danger giving rise to the duty to act. Thus, as a minimum,
knowledge of the danger with an ensuing failure to act "reasonably" would be required
for such an action.
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If, however, the language of Monroe is carried to its full extent with
"reasonableness" being adopted as the criterion for liability in both types
of cases, as some commentators have suggested,35 then certain procedural
safeguards are necessary to close partially the "floodgates" apparently
opened by Huey.30 In an attempt to confine the expansive effect of
34fomroe, several courts,3 7 including the Huey court,3" have supplemented
the "reasonableness" test by requiring plaintiffs to allege highly specific
facts as to acts or omissions by the defendant which have a "causal con-
nection" to the alleged discrimination. 9 If, as Huey suggests, any causal
connection between an action or inaction regardless of intent, with the
resulting deprivation of a constitutional right, will lead to liability, the
requirement of highly specific allegations will at least provide a marginal
shelter from litigious "victims" of allegedly discriminatory acts. Such a
requirement of specificity, however, will not prevent any valid complaint
from being raised.
The inappropriateness of the "reasonableness" test is most apparent
in omission or non-action cases. Under such a standard liability would
presumably attach even where public officers are uninformed of threats to
certain persons or classes of persons if it appears that the officers should
have been aware of the situation." By adding the requirement of
alleging highly specific facts, however, the courts seem to be saying an
awareness or knowledge of potential danger with a subsequent failure
to act must be present. Certain types 6f broad omissions cannot be alleged
in detail, and a specific act or omission which can be alleged in terms of
specific facts would almost certainly be an act or omission of which the
defendant was aware.4 Thus, the addition of the specificity requirement
- 35. See Colley, Civil Actions for Damages Arising out of Violations of Civil Rights,
17 HASTINGS L.J. 189 (1965); Shapo, supra note 3; Note, 12 HOWARD L.J. 285, 297
(1966) ; Comment, Civil Actions for Damages Under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes,
45 TEx. L. REV. 1015, 1035 (1967).
36. One writer suggests that "without this procedural requirement of specificity,
the floodgates may be opened and the federal courts would be swamped with ordinary
tort suits filed under the guise of section 1983." Note, Liability of a Public Officer for
Nonfeasance under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 25 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 243, 248 (1968).
37. See, e.g., Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1963) ; United States
ex rel. Hoge v. Bolsinger, 311 F.2d 215, 216 (3d Cir. 1962) ; Fowler v. United States,
258 F. Supp. 638, 645 (C.D. Cal. 1966) ; Pugliano v. Staziak, 231 F. Supp. 347, 349
(W.D. Pa. 1964) ; Roberts v. Barbosa, 227 F. Supp. 20, 22 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
38. 277 F. Supp. at 873.
39. 277 F. Supp. at 873. See also Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965);
Zeppi v. Beach, 229 Cal. App. 2d 152, 40 Cal. Rptr. 183, 187 (1964).
40. The complaint in Huey alleges "that the defendants knew or, by the exercise of
reasonable care, should have known that the presence of Negroes on the public streets
of Cicero constituted a hazard to their personal safety .. " 277 F. Supp. at 868.
41. It is doubtful that the plaintiff in Huey, for example, could have made his
allegations any more specific. Thus the requirement of alleging a specific act or omission
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when combined with the test of "reasonableness" seems to approach a
test of gross negligence-knowledge of danger plus inaction--closely
bordering on intent.
Conclusion
Huey v. Barloga suggests that public officers may be held liable for
an unintentional omission of their duty to provide equal protection to all
persons. In replacing the prior requirement of intentional deprivation of
such right for recovery under section 1983, Huey adopts the standard of
"reasonableness" as applied under traditional tort doctrine. The Supreme
Court, however, has apparently eliminated intent only in due process
cases arising under section 1983.
Use of a "reasonableness" standard in determining violations of due
process rights is logical since such violations typically involve a specific
act or omission which can be readily judged against an independent
standard of due process. The right of equal protection cannot be fairly
judged under a "reasonableness" standard, however, since violations can
be determined only by comparison to the situations of others on a case-by-
case basis. Consequently, "reasonableness" in the context of equal pro-
tection has no well-defined content or reference by which a public officer
can gauge his decisions and actions. In addition, equal protection actions
under section 1983 commonly involve only a generalized claim of
negligence with no specific acts or omissions which can be appraised.
It is important that the above distinctions be acknowledged so that courts
do not go so far in applying section 1983 to plaintiffs claiming a denial
of equal protection as to require public officials to be the guarantors of
public safety.
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would prevent an action in all such cases where there was no specific notice of the
danger.
42. Concerning liability of public officers for infringing a citizen's rights which are
not well defined, Bowens v. Knazze, 237 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1965), states that:
The measure of a citizen's constitutional rights is not left to the determination
of the community at large. It is determined by the courts. If that standard has
not yet been enunciated by a court in a manner which makes its applicability
to the incident at hand clear, the potential defendant cannot be expected to
conform his conduct to it.
